The concept is to launch a pilot project focused on the emergence of a new equilibrium between three negotiators A-B-C (including the Community, “C”) in a bargain between two. How can this happen?
This work started with a simplistic syllogism: Capitalism with its fundamental axioms of the "free market" and "competition" has solved many problems but created more One of these is the "social inequality" and the consequent absence of "social welfare"
The "bargain" and the subsequent “bargaining power” manifested in and by this are on the basis of the capitalist system
In the bargain there are two (2) quite rational negotiators with totally opposite interests that try to achieve an agreement (or even disagreement), pursuing each one to gain the greatest individual (and not collective) profit
It seems to me, that the "social welfare"(the objective of a probable “social choice”) is impossible within the capitalist system that has at its center the man who acts rationally and always for his personal interests
It was very easy for Kenneth Arrow (1950)[1] to prove the "impossibility” of Social Choice (inside the capitalist system) in his homonymous theorem (which earned him the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1972)
“Game Theory” [especially, the “Non-cooperative Game Theory”] has an important contribution to restart the “New-classical economic school” due to its character, as a conflict game between 2: The theory of games[2] is a mathematical discipline designed to treat rigorously the question of optimal behavior of participants in games of strategy and to determine the resulting equilibria. Thus, in games of strategy[3] there is conflict of interest as well as possible cooperation among the participants. There may be uncertainty for each participant because the actions of others may not be known with certainty. Such situations, often of extreme complexity, are found not only in games but also in business, politics, war, and other social activities. Therefore, the theory serves to interpret both games themselves and social phenomena with which certain games are strictly identical. The theory is normative in that it aims at giving advice to each player about his optimal behavior; it is descriptive when viewed as a model for analyzing empirically given occurrences. In analyzing games the theory does not assume rational behavior; rather, it attempts to determine what “rational” can mean when an individual is confronted with the problem of optimal behavior in games and equivalent situations[4].
In contrast, if it were possible to import third party (natural or legal person, company, state, associations of states) to negotiation between two (2) then this "new" person should have a dual character, to produce results:
(a) as the third member of the bargaining
(b) as the "entity -umbrella", or as an agent over the other two negotiators, claiming his share of any agreement (or disagreement)
[1] Kenneth Arrow 1951, 2nd ed., 1963 Social Choice and Individual Values, Yale University Press
[2]Martin Shubik 1953 (with J. P. Mayberry and Nash "A Comparison of Treatments of a Duopoly Situation," Econometrica 21(1), pp.141--154.
[3] Martin Shubik, 1999. Political Economy, Oligopoly And Experimental Games: The Selected Essays of Martin Shubik, 2 v.,
[4] Martin Shubik (2015) Economic applications Encyclopedia. com
